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Influences Affecting the Licensing of
Rights in a Unitary European Markett
Ronald E. Myrick*
INTRODUCTION
Europe today is one of the most dynamic environments for the
development of intellectual property and licensing law, as there are
multiple currents and cross-currents reflecting themselves in a vari-
ety of initiatives and jurisprudential developments. The Commis-
sion of the European Communities ("European Commission" or
"Commission") is particularly active through its Directorate Gener-
al II in developing harmonization and other regulatory initiatives
for intellectual property, primarily focusing currently on copyright
and design protection, but with potential policy implications for
patents as well. In addition, the Commission through its Director-
ate General IV is also exerting substantial influence on the devel-
opment of intellectual property and licensing law through its activi-
ties regarding competition policy and the interface between that
policy and intellectual property and its impending update or consol-
idation of the patent and know-how licensing block exemptions.
Other Directorates General are also influential in varying degrees.
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the Member States and the Europe-
an Community ("Community" or "EC") is also developing along
paths which have substantial potential for impact on various aspects
t This paper was presented at the Fordham Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy held at Fordham University School of Law on April 15-16,
1993. An earlier version of this paper was prepared with the help and advice of
Jeremy Brown and Tim Lord of Linklaters & Paines, London office, Maurits Dolmans
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prepared with the further assistance of Douglas F. Flood of Fish & Richardson, Boston
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of intellectual property law including patents.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of these cur-
rents, cross-currents, initiatives, jurisprudential developments, and
other influences which can and do conflict with varying effect on
the intellectual property law system and on the foundations for
licensing. Only selected influences will be addressed in the context
of their impact upon the environment for licensing, with particular
emphasis on the underlying systems of rights, in the Europe of the
future. Moreover, the law in respect of many of these influences
is unsettled or developing such that there remains considerable
scholarly debate on many issues. In this paper, some of that debate
will be ventilated, but by no means all, and some positions dis-
cussed herein are themselves the subject of continuing study and
critical review. It is hoped that this paper may contribute in some
way to the debate, hopefully positively. Finally, the debate on
these issues is vital and active, so much so that this paper has been
and will be in a developmental flux of its own as new factors,
issues and influences appear in this process of dynamic develop-
ment of intellectual property law.
In considering licensing one must begin with the foundation of
rights that may be licensed. In this regard, for example, national
patents remain the only currently available patent option in Europe
and this may continue to be the case in the medium term. A Com-
munity patent for the whole European Community has been
planned but bedeviled with problems for many years. Efforts are
being made to push' it forward. Even if the Community patent
becomes a reality, however, national patent systems will remain.
How "viable" national patents will be depends on, inter alia, how
well they are respected by the European Community and national
courts in the light of Community rules such as those on free move-
ment of goods and also competition law. In this context the term
"viable" is used to refer to the ability of patents to secure the full
range of rights, including exclusionary rights, which may be used
by the rights proprietor or licensed by same. This then will be the
principal focus of this paper.
It is necessary that some background in the instruments and
institutions of the Community be provided to form a base for the
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discussion substantively of influences on licensing in Europe. Each
of these instruments and institutions has a role to play in develop-
ing intellectual property and licensing law and policy in Europe.
Indeed, many of the institutions are currently actively involved as
various initiatives and adjudications are in progress which will have
substantial effect on intellectual property and licensing law and
policy. Therefore, it is desirable to set the scene by describing in
a broad and general way the nature of the European Community
(which may come to comprise virtually all of Europe by the turn
of the century or shortly thereafter). For those who are already
familiar with the Community, Part I of this paper will be quite ba-
sic, but it is hoped that it will be a useful general foundation. The
succeeding Parts II and II also set the scene by describing the
current position of patents in Europe, again, quite generally. The
substantive discussion of the principal topic at hand for this paper
begins at Part IV.
I. EUROPE AlTER 1992--GENERALLY
A. The Original Objectives of the European Community
The European Community was founded by the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, frequently referred to as
the Treaty of Rome ("Treaty" or "EEC Treaty").' The Treaty came
into effect on January 1, 1958. There are now 12, Member States:
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
(the original six members), plus Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The founders aimed to create a single economic community.
According to Article 2 of the Treaty, they agreed to establish a
Common Market, progressively approximate the economic policies
of Member States and thus the relevant laws, and promote through-
out the Community a "harmonious development of economic activ-
ities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability,
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741.
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an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it." Thereby they would create a
Common Market in which goods, services, labor, and capital would
move as freely throughout the Community as they could within
each Member State and in which the economies of the Member
States would be coordinated. As its aims were originally expressed
in the Treaty, the Community was to be primarily economic in
nature, but economics can never be divorced entirely from politics.
Thus, a fundamental principle underlying both the application of
the Treaty and of Community law generally is the advancement of
the goal of European economic union; some would say simply
"European Union!" The application of Community competition
law and, increasingly, developments in intellectual property law
within the Community, reflect this goal.
B. The Unitary Market
Although considerable progress had been made by the mid-
1980s, the Member States were still far from achieving, the ideals
set out in the Treaty and in many respects national markets re-
mained fragmented. Individual country's markets continued to
remain separate internal markets as a result of a host of direct and
indirect non-tariff barriers. These were often actively used to pre-
vent exporters in other Member States from gaining access to na-
tional markets on a fair and competitive basis with local firms.
A renewed determination arose on the part of the European
Commission to remove these residual barriers and achieve a true
Common Market, and "1992" was shorthand for the resulting legis-
lative program.
C. The White Paper
In 1985, the Commission published a "White Paper" 2 on "Com-
pleting the Internal Market" in which it set out an "eight-year plan"
for demolishing physical, technical, and fiscal barriers and creating
a single integrated internal market by the end of 1992.
The White Paper was a wide-ranging review. It took stock of
2. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final.
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developments achieved so far, focused on those areas where Com-
munity measures were required, outlined the Commission's propos-
als for action, and proposed a timetable for the adoption of appro-
priate measures by the Council of Ministers. It did not purport to
be a detailed plan for every area of European integration or a com-
prehensive list of all the Commission's proposed measures affect-
ing the internal market. It did, however, attempt to identify the
principal barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital within the Community. The White Paper was therefore
an important statement of Commission policy with regard to those
issues which are of principal concern to European undertakings
and, indeed, to non-EC enterprises wishing either to invest in EC
companies or to trade in the Community.
The White Paper outlined a program of nearly three hundred
proposals for completion of the internal market and the removal of
physical, technical, and fiscal barriers by the end of 1992.
D. The Single European Act
The commitment to complete the single or unitary market was
formally embodied in a special act, the Single European Act, which
has been in force throughout the Community since July 1, 1987. 3
It is a treaty amending and supplementing the EEC Treaty and has
been adopted and given effect under domestic law in each of the
Member States. The Act defines "internal market" as "an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured" and requires the Commu-
nity to adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing
the internal market by the end of 1992.
Responsibility for these measures was spread across a number
of different ministerial Councils-seventeen concerned the Internal
Market Council, twenty-five the Economics and Finance Council,
and twenty the Agriculture Council. Six Member States, including
the U.K., had implemented seventy-five percent or more of the
White Paper measures. Five fell within the sixty to seventy-five
percent category. Italy was at the bottom of the list with just forty
3. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
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percent of measures implemented.
More recently, a further step in the evolution of the EC has
been attempted in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
("Maastricht Treaty") which was signed on February 7, 1992. 4 The
Maastricht Treaty represented the culmination of more than a
year's work in two inter-governmental conferences, one on political
union and one on economic and monetary union. It attempts to
make various amendments to the EEC Treaty, extending the policy
areas in which the EC has "competence" and including new provi-
sions on, inter alia, foreign and security policy, interior and justice
matters, citizenship, and social policy (although Britain elected to
opt out of the social policy provisions signed by the other eleven
Member States).
Changes are also to be made to the EC institutional structure
which will mean that the European Parliament will have new pow-
ers in monitoring the EC's financial affairs as well as increased
influence in the EC legislation procedure.
A timetable for implementation of the provisions for economic
and monetary union is set out in the Maastricht Treaty, which aims
for a single currency by 1999, at the latest. However, it must now
be ratified by all twelve Member States before it can come into
force. The target date was January 1993. This proved to be opti-
mistic and various obstacles remain in the path of ratification at
this time. The Single European Act (which provoked a referendum
in Ireland) took nearly eighteen months from signature (February
8, 1986) to entry into force (July 1, 1987). It remains to be seen
how much time will be needed to ratify the Maastricht Treaty and
indeed what form the treaty will take in the end.
E. EC Institutions
1. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers ("Council") is the Community's prin-
cipal legislative body, although some legislative competence is
delegated to the Commission. The Council acts on proposals sub-
4. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719.
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mitted to it by the Commission. It is made up of ministerial repre-
sentatives from each of the Member States. The actual make-up of
a particular meeting of the Council depends upon the subject at
hand. The presidency of the Council carries considerable political
influence and rotates every six months among the Member States.
2. The European Commission
The Commission is the Community's executive. Its principal
job is to prepare and propose new policies and laws for the Com-
munity and to ensure that decisions, once taken,' are carried out.
The seventeen Commissioners are not elected, but nominated by
their governments. Once appointed, however, they owe their duty
to the Community; they are not representatives of the individual
Member States. The Commission has a support staff of about
1200. It is organized into twenty-three specialist departments
called "Directorates-General" ("DGs") based in Brussels plus a
central Secretariat. Important DGs presently for intellectual proper-
ty rights and technology generally include the following, but the
Commission is being reorganized and these may change:
DG III Internal Market and Industrial Affairs
DG IV Competition
DG XI Environment, Consumer Protection and Nuclear
Safety
DG XII Science, Research and Development
DG XIII Telecommunications, Information Industries and
Innovation.
Generally, the Commission has the power to initiate legislation.
As such, it is an active source of intellectual property initiatives
and many such initiatives are in work at the moment. While the
Commission may not finally decide these initiatives itself, in one
sense the Commission holds the pen on such initiatives and is very
influential in regard to the development of intellectual property
within the Community.
3. The European Parliament
The members of the European Parliament ("Parliament") are
directly elected in elections held throughout the Community every
1993]
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five years. The Parliament is playing an increasing role as a result
of increased powers given it by the Single European Act. For
instance, under Article 100a the Council must decide on the content
of legislation relating to the internal market with the "cooperation"
of the Parliament. The consequence of this is that the Parliament
has a right of "second reading" in respect of such legislation, in
effect most of the legislation relating to the 1992 program. The
Parliament's influence will be further increased as a result of the
new "co-decision procedure" embodied in the Maastricht Treaty.
This is discussed more fully below.
4. The Economic and Social Committee
The Economic and Social Committee ("ECOSOC") is an advi-
sory or consultative body made up of members drawn from various
walks of economic and social life (e.g., trade unionists, producers,
farmers, and professional people). It has few real powers. The
ECOSOC's main significance is that the Treaty often requires it to
deliver opinions to the Council on proposals issued by the Com-
mission. For example, Article 100a requires the Council to consult
with the ECOSOC on legislation concerning the internal market.
5. The European Court of Justice and Court of First In-
stance
Based in Luxembourg, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"),
often called the Court, comprises thirteen judges (one from each
Member State, plus one chosen in rotation from the five biggest
Member States to ensure an uneven number). The ECJ is the final
arbiter of Community law. It must be remembered that Communi-
ty law now forms part of the domestic law of each Member State,
and that where there is a conflict, Community law prevails. The
ECJ's job is to see that Community law is properly applied
throughout the Community. Thus, in matters where the Communi-
ty is competent, the ECJ is the highest court of appeal.
The Court of First Instance ("CH") was established by the
Single European Act to lessen the ECJ's work load. All competi-
tion-related cases are now generally heard first by the CFI, leaving
the ECJ to concentrate on important or complex matters. CH deci-
sions are subject to an appeal to the ECJ. The CH is playing an
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important role as its decisions of recent date have generated consid-
erable influence and debate. Witness the decision of the CFI in the
Magill cases5 discussed below which have generated or are gener-
ating much interest.6
F. European Community Legislation
Legislation may take the form of regulations, directives, deci-
sions, or recommendations and opinions.
Directives define the results to be achieved and require that
national legislation be introduced by a specified date. Within de-
fined parameters, the form and method of achieving results is left
to the discretion of national governments. Certain directives have,
however, been interpreted as being directly applicable and thus
have an effect similar to regulations. As examples, a directive is
in place for the protection of software by copyright; 7 one was re-
cently proposed for the protection of databases; 8 one has been pro-
posed for some time to harmonize patentability of biotechnological
inventions. 9
Regulations, in contrast, are immediately binding on all Mem-
5. Radio Telefis lireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586
(Ct. First Instance) (Magill TV Guide intervening); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Com-
mission, Case T-70/89, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance) (Magill TV Guide
intervening); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-76/89,
[1991] 4 C.M.L. R. 745 (Ct. First Instance). In the text, for convenience, these cases
will be referred to collectively as Magill, but it should be noted that the BBC case (T-
70/89) was not appealed to the European Court of Justice. Therefore, the shorthand
usage of the collective term Magill in regard to the proceedings in the Court of First
Instance refers to all three cases for convenience, and in regard to the proceedings in
the Court of Justice, refers to only those which were appealed thereto.
6. BASF, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij, DSM & DSM Kunststoffen, Huls,
Atochem, Socidt6 Artesienne de Vinyl, Wacker Chemie, Enichem, Hoechst, ICI, Shell
Int'l Chem. Co. & Montedison v. Commission, Joined Cases T-79, T-84, T-85, T-86,
T-89, T-91, T-92, T-94, T-96, T-98, T-102 & T-104/89, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357.
7. Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122/42 (1991) [hereinafter Software Directive].
8. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(92)24 final-SYN 393 [hereinafter Database Directive].
9. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, O.J. C 10/3 (1989); Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, O.J. C 44/36 (1993) [hereinafter Bio-
technological Directive].
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ber States and individuals. They are "directly effective." No na-
tional legislation is required for their implementation. Interestingly,
the Commission has proposed (and the Council has adopted) a
regulation, rather than a directive, to provide for extended terms for
pharmaceutical patents in the Community.
10
Decisions of the Council or Commission are binding on Mem-
ber States or any other legal or natural person to whom they are
addressed who may be affected by them.
Recommendations and opinions have no legal force as such and
are merely advisory. Often the aim is to encourage desirable, but
not necessarily enforceable, practices throughout the Community.
G. The Legislative Procedure
The Council can delegate its powers to allow the Commission
to adopt regulations and directives without further reference back
to the Council, usually acting on technical advice given by a
Standing Committee-those procedures will not be discussed fur-
ther here. What follows are the procedures by which major Euro-
pean Community legislation is adopted.
There are two current procedures and a third proposed.
1. Consultative Procedure
Under the simple consultative procedure the Commission makes
a proposal for a directive or regulation to the Council. The Euro-
pean Parliament and ECOSOC must deliver a formal opinion, but
the Council is free to ignore any such recommendations made. The
Commission may revise its proposal at any time up to the final
adoption by the Council. However, the Council may amend the
proposal only if acting by unanimity. If the proposal is acceptable
to the Council, it will adopt it (by qualified majority or unanimous-
ly as the Treaty requires). If the Council cannot reach agreement,
the proposal lies dormant until such time as a consensus can be
achieved.
10. Commission Regulation of 18 June 1992 Concerning the Creation of a Supple-
mentary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products, 1768/92/EEC, O.J. L 182/1 (1992).
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2. Cooperation Procedure
The Cooperation Procedure was introduced (with effect from
July 1987) to try to speed up the legislative process and to give the
European Parliament more power. Under this procedure, once a
proposal has been made by the Commission, the Council must
adopt a "Common Position" which takes into account the Parlia-
ment's opinion on that proposal. This Common Position goes back
to the Parliament for a second reading and time limits then apply.
The Parliament has three months to approve the Common Position
or propose amendments. If it approves (or does nothing), the
Council must adopt the proposal forthwith. If the Parliament re-
jects the Common Position, the Council can overrule the Parliament
but must do so by unanimity. If the Parliament proposes amend-
ments, the Commission then has a month to review them and sub-
mit its views to the Council. The Council has three months either
to adopt the Commission's proposal by a-qualified majority or
adopt by unanimity any Parliament amendments not approved by
the Commission. If the Council fails to act at all, the proposal
lapses.
3. Proposed Co-decision Procedure: Maastricht Treaty
At Maastricht, a new "co-decision" procedure was agreed to
which would increase still further the influence of the European
Parliament in the EC legislative process. Under the new procedure
(which, of course, is not yet -in forcel"), once the Council has
adopted a Common Position, if the European Parliament proposes
amendments which the Council cannot accept, a Conciliation Com-
mittee (consisting of an equal member of Council Members and of
Parliament representatives) will be set up to try to agree upon a
joint text. The Commission's role will be to try to reconcile the
positions of the Council and of the Parliament. Decisions of the
Committee will be taken by a qualified majority vote of Council
representatives and simple majority of Parliament representatives.
The Committee has six weeks in which to achieve a joint text,
and then the full Parliament and the Council have a further six
11. [Eds. note: The Maastricht Treaty came into force on November 1, 1993.]
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weeks in which to approve this text. If no joint text can be agreed,
the Council has six weeks in which to confirm its original Com-
mon Position, with or without amendments proposed by the Parlia-
ment, but this can then be blocked by the Parliament, voting within
a further six weeks to reject the text. Limited extensions of these
time limits are possible in some circumstances.
If, on the other hand, the Parliament intends to reject complete-
ly the Council's Common Position, either the Conciliation Commit-
tee is again set up or the proposal lapses. This is different from
the cooperation procedure where, you will recall, the Council is
able to override the Parliament and adopt its Common Position by
unanimity. However, the Parliament is going to have to be disci-
plined about timing when voting on co-decision proposals. If it
fails to take a view within three months on a Common Position, the
Council may adopt it. Whenever the Parliament votes in the co-
decision procedure, it must achieve an absolute majority of its
members, i.e., 260 votes (half of 518, plus one) have to be cast, not
merely a majority of these present when the vote is taken.
No transitional provisions were provided in the Maastricht
Treaty for legislative proposals going through the decision-making
process at the time the Treaty comes into force, so the procedure
to be used will depend on the stage a particular proposal has
reached (Council Common Position, Parliament position on Council
Common Position, and so on). Bearing in mind the lobbying and
publicity which surrounded the debating of the Software Directive 2
during 1988 to 1990, and the "Green" opposition to the proposed
directive to harmonize patentability of biotechnological inven-
tions,13 new initiatives (like the proposed directive on protection for
databases 14) may have an easier or harder legislative passage de-
pending on the stage they have reached when the Maastricht Treaty
comes into force.
12. Software Directive, supra note 7.
13. Biotechnological Directive, supra note 9.
14. Database Directive, supra note 8.
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II. PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN EUROPE-THE CURRENT POSI-
TION
A. Introduction
Currently all patents and most copyrights in Europe are nation-
ally based. For example, to date, there is no pan-European nor
even pan-EC patent. The discussion that follows focuses on pat-
ents as exemplary of many points common to patents, copyrights,
and some other intellectual property rights under Community and
Member State law; there are, of course, differences in the treatment
of the various rights, but all those differences are beyond the scope
of this discussion.
A Community patent is contemplated and efforts are currently
under way to get it off the ground. The Community patent is,
however, not intended to replace national patent rights, but to com-
plement such rights. Therefore, currently, national rights remain
the only available rights.
Patent protection is available by applying individually at each
national patent office or by using the streamlined routes offered by
the European Patent Convention 5 ("EPC") or Patent Cooperation
Treaty16 ("PCT") or a combination of these.
B. The European Patent Convention
The EPC system provides for centralized filing, examination,
and prosecution before the European Patent Office ("EPO") in
Munich. The countries in which patents are desired must be desig-
nated when making the application. If granted, the application then
issues not as a single "European" patent but as a bundle of national
patents in the designated countries.
The EPC has proved a major force in harmonizing patent laws
in Europe (including the EC). All the EC countries have ratified
the EPC and so have all the European Free Trade Association
("EFTA") countries, except Finland and Iceland. Most of the EC
and EFTA Member States have also amended their national laws
15. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, Munich, 13 I.L.M.
270.
16. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.
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to harmonize them with the EPC. Although not members of the
EPC, both Finland and Norway have amended their laws in confor-
mity with the EPC. So the underlying national patent statutes with-.
in Europe now are significantly in harmony.
Although the statutory patent laws may be similar, it does not
follow that national courts will always interpret statutory provisions
or patent claims similarly. As a consequence, there is still signifi-
cant diversity in the application of patent law in Europe. Accord-
ingly, to promote consistency among the courts, a Protocol on the
Interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC provides in essence that the
correct approach by the courts to patent claim construction is not
to apply a strict literal meaning or only to use the claims as a
guideline but to arrive at a middle ground "which combines a fair
protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for
third parties." Notwithstanding this, considerable diversity still
exists.
C. National Patent Systems
The respective national patent systems remain in each Member
State (or in the case of Benelux Member State grouping), and the
national patent laws co-exist alongside the EPC, notwithstanding
substantial harmonization. The EPC has proved extremely success-
ful since its inception in 1978, and the majority of patent applica-
tions in Europe are probably now filed through the European rather
than national route.
D. Patent Cooperation Treaty
The PCT system is not an alternative to the European or nation-
al systems but sits alongside them as a way of preserving an appli-
cant's position and enabling a preliminary search to be obtained
before the expenses of general international filings need be in-
curred. It is therefore basically a work saving arrangement where-
by the applicant effectively has twenty months after filing a basic
application to file national applications in other participating coun-
tries. In the meantime, he will have obtained an international
search report which will help him decide if and how best to pro-
ceed with a full filing program.
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I. COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR "ABUSE" OF RIGHTS
The national patent laws of the EC all provide for the imposi-
tion of compulsory licenses in appropriate circumstances. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to cover each country. Taking the
United Kingdom as an illustration, the circumstances in which
compulsory licenses may be imposed are dealt with in section 48
of the U.K. Patent Act.' 7 The grounds upon which a compulsory
license may be obtained in the United Kingdom 18 are briefly: (i)
a patented invention capable of being commercially worked in the
United Kingdom is not being so worked at all or to the fullest
extent that is reasonably practicable; (ii) demand for a patented
product in the United Kingdom is not being met on reasonable
terms or is being met to a substantial extent by importation only;
(iii) the commercial working of the patented invention in the Unit-
ed Kingdom is being prevented or hindered by the importation of
the patented product or the product of a patented process; (iv) by
reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a license or licenses
on reasonable terms, a market for the export of any patented prod-
uct made in the United Kingdom is not being supplied; or the
working or the efficient working in the United Kingdom of any
patented invention which makes a substantial contribution to the art
is prevented or hindered; or the establishment or development of
commercial or industrial activities in the United Kingdom is unfair-
ly prejudiced; and (v) the manufacture, use, or disposal of materials
not protected by the patent or the establishment or development of
commercial or industrial activities in the United Kingdom, is un-
fairly prejudiced by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee
on the grant of licenses under the patent, or on the disposal or use
of the patented product, or on the use of the patented process.
17. Patent Act of 1977, § 48 (U.K.).
18. It had been thought for some time that the failure of section 48 to recognize
working of the patent anywhere within the EC rather than just in the United Kingdom
was inconsistent with the U.K.'s.Treaty obligations. This was confirmed by the ECJ
when it held that the United Kingdom and Italy were in breach of Article 30 of the EEC
Treaty insofar as they did not recognize working anywhere in the EC as sufficient. The
same will of course apply to other Member States which similarly require national work-
ing.
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In appropriate cases, licenses may be granted not only to the
applicant but also to the applicant's customers. Furthermore, exist-
ing licenses to the applicant may be cancelled and replaced by the
new one, or the existing license may be amended. There are also
provisions allowing the Government to effect compulsory licenses
where reasons of national security so demand.
These are the provisions contained in the Patents Act for impo-
sition of a compulsory license effectively resulting from an abuse
of the exclusive right granted to the patentee by the Act. The De-
signs Act19 also includes compulsory license provisions. There are
no such statutory, general compulsory licensing provisions in the
United Kingdom for copyrights. The Patent Act also contains
separate provisions negating the enforceability of a patent or validi-
ty of a licensing agreement when certain restrictive provisions are
present in the agreement.
IV. EC GOALS VERSUS NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
As discussed above, nationally based intellectual property rights
are the only option for patent protection in Europe today, and the
same is true, to a large extent, for copyrights as well. We have
also seen that the aim of the EC is to create a single market within
which firms can be active across borders, competing on a fair and
efficient basis. In this single market, goods and services should be
able to circulate freely, without hindrance because of the mere fact
that they cross the border between one Member State and another.
The aim was to achieve this by the end of 1992.
Intellectual property rights such as patent rights are by their
very nature exclusive. The patentee may, if he chooses, derive
remuneration from exploitation by licensees. But he may also, in
his discretion, keep the right to exploit for himself and exclude all
third parties from using the invention. The protective effect of
patents is limited to the territory of the Member State granting such
protection. National patent rights, therefore, potentially create
19. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48 (U.K.).
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barriers to trade between Member States; a tension can therefore
exist between national patent rights and the principles of free
movement. By their nature, such rights also affect the abilities of
third parties to compete with the patentee, thus presenting a further
tension between patent law and competition law. Accordingly, the
continued viability (in the sense of continued effectiveness as rights
of exclusion) of national patent rights in the EC depends on such
tensions being properly rationalized by the Commission and the
ECJ.
It is now well established that in case of conflict, Community
law prevails over the national law of Member States. However,
against this background, Article 222 of the EEC Treaty provides
that the provisions of the Treaty (including those on free movement
and competition) "shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member
States governing the system of property ownership." This provi-
sion has been held also to apply to intellectual property, including
patents.20
There is thus a degree of tension between the Community ideal
and, specifically, the free movement of goods provisions of the
Treaty, and patents and other forms of intellectual property. Pat-
ents can resurrect borders between Member States and, at first
sight, reduce or even eliminate competition.21 The holder of the
right thus seems to be in a position to defeat (or at least frustrate)
the objectives of the Community. It is from the inherent conflict
between these notions-the territorial status of exclusive national
20. See Itablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v.
Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, 1 22, [1966] E.C.R. 299, 345, [1966] 5
C.M.L.R. 418, 442; see also Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Case 24/67, 5, [1968]
E.C.R. 55, 72, [1968] 7 C.M.L.R. 47, 52; Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer,
Parke, Davis, [1968] E.C.R. at 77, [19681 7 C.M.L.R. at 48; Deutsche Grammophon
Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grollmdrkte GmbH & Co. KG, Case 78/70, 1 11,
[1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
21. It would be wrong simply to describe intellectual property rights as "anti-
competitive." They are needed to reward efforts made in the development of new
products or techniques, or in creating goodwill of a firm, and thus to create an incen-
tive to induce firms to incur the risks associated with new developments. Intellectual
property rights are thus deliberately endowed with exclusivity to achieve an increase
of competition superior to the limitation of competition resulting from the exclusive
character of the intellectual property right.
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rights and the unified market with free competition-that problems
in connection with patents and, indeed, other forms of intellectual
property, are perceived to arise.
It should be noted in passing that similar, but not identical,
issues arise in the context of other categories of intellectual proper-
ty, notably trademark, copyright, and design rights. However, pre-
cisely because the characteristics of each type of intellectual prop-
erty are different, care must be taken to tailor the resolution of the
conflict between national intellectual property rights and free move-
ment in each case having regard to the particular categories of
intellectual property in question.
The relationships between EC law and national patent rights
may be further affected by the Maastricht Treaty's principle of
subsidiarity, according to which the EC should only take action
when objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States
acting individually. This principle is intended to guard against
over-centralization and over-regulation at the European level, but
it remains to be seen what effect it will have in relation to the
interaction between national intellectual property rights on the one
hand and the competition and free movement of goods provisions
of the EEC Treaty on the other.
The institutions of the Community and the- Member States have
thus far endeavored to find solutions on three different levels.
First, the EEC Treaty itself contains certain rules dealing with the
free movement of goods and with free competition, and these rules
may be used to balance conflicting objectives. Second, national
laws on patents and other forms of intellectual property rights may
be harmonized to mitigate some of the adverse effects caused by
the conflict. Third, the Community patent may be introduced and,
in due course, possibly other Community-wide intellectual property
rights.
Some of these solutions and the conclusions to be derived
therefrom are discussed below. Particular attention will be paid to
competition law as applied to patents. Before doing so, however,
it will be helpful to sketch briefly the way in which the application
of Community law to patents (and other forms of intellectual prop-
erty) has evolved.
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A. Articles 222 and 36
As mentioned above, Article 222 of the EEC Treaty protects
intellectual property rights. It provides that "[t]his Treaty shall in
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system
of property ownership." Article 222 is found in Part Six of the
Treaty, the "General and Final Provisions," and therefore applies
to all of the provisions of the Treaty.
By contrast, the "free movement of goods" provisions (Articles
30 to 36) are included in Part Two, Title I of the Treaty. Article
36 provides:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 [on the free movement
of goods] shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of
. . . the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, consti-
tute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on trade between Member States. V
While Article 36 applies to free movement of goods cases, it
does not apply to competition (the competition provisions are found
in Part Three, Title 1, Chapter 1, "Rules on Competition" of the
Treaty). This may be relevant because Article 36 is more stringent
than Article 222 in that it contains a reference to arbitrary discrimi-
nation and disguised restrictions which Article 222 does not con-
tain. It may, however, be appropriate to contrast the ambit of the
two provisions. Article 222 applies to the existence of rights,
while Article 36 is concerned both with the existence and the exer-
cise of rights -and,. in particular, their use as a means of restricting
intra-Community trade.
1. The Meaning of Article 222
Article 222 underpins to a substantial degree the ECJ's case
law concerning intellectual property and competition. It is worth-
while therefore to review its precise meaning. In Consten &
Grundig v. Commission, one of its earliest cases concerning Article
85, the ECJ held that Article 222 also applies to intellectual proper-
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ty.22 In Parke, Davis the Advocate-General stated that Article 222
must be interpreted as meaning:
[AIll the basic elements of the national system of property
ownership must remain unchanged. This equally means
that the existence of rights appertaining to inventions analo-
gous to property rights must remain unchanged.23
It has been questioned whether this was the original intention of
the draftsmen of the Treaty.
The first draft of Article 222 provided that "[t]his Treaty shall
in no way prejudice the system of ownership of the means of pro-
duction existing in the Community."' The reference to "means of
production" was considered insufficiently clear and replaced by the
reference "of undertakings to which the provisions of this Treaty
apply. '"z- In the final drafting stages, these words ("of undertakings
... apply") were deleted.26 The result is a broadly stated provi-
sion.
The first drafts of Article 222 were very similar to Article 83
of the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") Treaty,27
which served to reserve the right of Member States to nationalize
or privatize coal and steel corporations. Some have suggested that
the original purpose of Article 222 was the same.28 The changes
22. Consten & Grundig, 1 22, [1966] E.C.R. at 345, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. at 442;
see also Parke, Davis, 1 5, [1968] E.C.R. at 72, [1968] 7 C.M.L.R. at 52; Opinion of
Advocate-General Roemer, Parke, Davis, [1968] E.C.R. at 77, [1968] 7 C.M.L.R. at
48; Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631.
23. Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer, Parke, Davis, [1968] E.C.R. at 77,
[1968] 7 C.M.L.R. at 48.
24. Draft of Dec. 5, 1956 of the Groupe de Redaction, art. 9, Doc. MAE 641/56
(1956).
25. Doc. MAE 177/57, art. 43 (Jan. 1, 1957).
26. Doc. MAE 243/57, art. 43 (Jan. 21, 1957); Doc. MAE 786/57, art. 282 (Mar.
6, 1957).
27. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140. Article 83 reads: 'Ihe establishment of the Community does not
in any way prejudice the regime of ownership of the enterprises subject to the provi-
sions of the present treaty."
28. 5 HANS SMIT & PETER HERzOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
CoMMuNITY, 6-216.64 (1993); see also Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer,
Consten & Grundig, [1966] E.C.R. at 303, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. at 422.
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that were made in the final drafts (in particular the deletion of "of
undertakings") and the wider application of the EEC Treaty beyond
the areas of coal and steel strongly suggest, however, that Article
222 has a broader scope. This issue was the subject of debate
immediately after the adoption of Article 222. The Commission
argued that Article 222 did not exempt intellectual property rights
from the application of the Treaty provisions.
29
The ECJ settled the matter and rationalized the debate in
Consten & Grundig and subsequent cases by developing an analy-
sis based upon the dichotomy between the existence of an intellec-
tual property right and its exercise. Since that time, the meaning
of Article 222 has not been directly challenged. The approach of
the ECJ to Article 222 does not mean that intellectual property
rights are sacrosanct and can be used to avoid the results to'be
achieved by the Treaty. The ECJ has held that:
[W]hilst the Treaty does not affect the existence of rights
recognized by the laws of a Member State in matters of
industrial and commercial property, yet the exercise of
those rights may nevertheless, depending on the circum-
stances, be restricted by the prohibitions contained in the
Treaty.30
So far in case law, the ECJ has consistently applied the distinc-
tion between exercise and existence to decide what will be subject
to its scrutiny and what will not. The question is how to distin-
guish the existence from the exercise of an intellectual property
29. See SM1T & HERZOG, supra note 28, at 6-216.65 to -216.66; see also Guiliano
Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules on Free
Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224, 226 (1990).
30. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 102/77, '1 6, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 217; see Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per
Autoveicoli v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265; Volvo AB v. Erik Veng UK Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R.
6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122; Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Grol3markte GmbH & Co., Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 499, [1971] 10 C.M.L.R. 631;
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Case 24/67, [1968] E.C.R. 55, [1968] 7 C.M.L.R. 47;
Opinion of Advocate-General, Parke, Davis, [1968] E.C.R. at 77, [1968] 7 C.M.L.R. at
48. All these cases also concerned the rules of competition.
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right.
(a) Specific Subject Matter
To ensure that the "existence" of an intellectual property right
in a given case before the ECJ is not prejudiced, the ECJ has in
almost every case defined the "specific subject matter" 31 or the
"substance 32 of the right involved or the "essential rights" of the
rightsholder.33 There may be minor semantic differences between
these terms. 4 In practice, however, these terms have been used
more or less interchangeably across the broad range of the ECJ
jurisprudence including both competition and free movement of
goods cases.35
From the case law of the ECJ it can be concluded that "exis-
tence," "substance," "specific subject matter," and "essential rights"
refer to a bundle of rights that are at the very core of the intellectu-
al property right at issue. In the case of a patent, for instance, it
has been held that its specific subject matter is:
The guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative ef-
31. Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74, 1 9, [1974] E.C.R. 1147,
1162, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, 503-04; Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, Case 187/80, 1 4,
[1981] E.C.R. 2063, 2080, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463, 481; Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v.
Commission, Case 193/83, [1986] E.C.R. 611, 655, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489, 540; Allen
& Hanburys v. Generics, Case 434/85, TI 10-11, [19881 E.C.R. 1273, [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 701, 714; Volvo, 1 8, [1988] E.C.R. at 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135;
Renault, NI 11, 15, [1988] E.C.R. 6039, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265; see also Van Zuylen
v. Hag, Case 192/73, 1 9, [1974] E.C.R. 731, 744, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127, 143;
Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, Case 16/74, 8, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, 1194, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480, 503; Hoffmann-La Roche, [1978] E.C.R. at 1164, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at
241; Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapfere & Co., Case
119/75, TI 5-6, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, 1061, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 490; SA CNL
Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 [hereinafter Hag II].
32. Merck, 1 9, [1981] E.C.R. at 2081, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 480-81; Pharmon
BV v. Hoechst AG, Case 19/84, 1 26, [1985] E.C.R. 2281, 2298, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
775, 790-91.
33. Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, 1 13, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, 2629,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684, 698.
34. For instance, in Merck v. Stephar, the words "specific purpose" were used as
a synonym for "specific subject matter" and the "substance" of the patent (the core
rights associated with the patent) was derived therefrom. [1981] E.C.R. 2063, [1981]
3 C.M.L.R. 463.
35. See, e.g., Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, '1 7 (arts. 30 & 36), 1 39 (art. 85),
[1974] E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480.
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fort of the inventor, has the exclusive right to use an inven-
tion with a view to manufacturing industrial products and
putting them into circulation for the first time, either direct-
ly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as the
right to oppose infringement.36
This definition protects the patent holder against unauthorized
application of his invention and against the marketing of products
or services using his invention without his permission and is thus
central to the patent's fundamental role of encouraging innovation
by granting monopolistic rights as a compensation device.
The core bundle of rights is distinguished from rights that only
constitute the fringe of the intellectual property right.37 An exam-
ple of such a fringe characteristic is the territorial nature of the
right in situations where national law allows the rightsholder to
prevent imports of products marketed abroad by him or with his
consent.
(b) Interesting Aside on Article 222
A final note on an issue that may be relevant for harmonization
of intellectual property law within the Community is that Article
222 applies to national intellectual property, so as to protect its
"existence" and, therefore, its specific subject matter. Article 222
36. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, j 9, [19741 E.C.R. at 1162, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at
503. See also Merck v. Stephar, 9I 9-10, [1981] E.C.R. at 2081, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at
481, where the ECJ said that:
mhe substance of a patent right lies essentially in according the inventor an
exclusive right of first placing the product on the market. That right of first
placing a product on the market enables the inventor, by allowing him a mo-
nopoly in exploiting his product, to obtain the reward for his creative effort
without, however, guaranteeing that he will obtain such a reward in all circum-
stances.
Id.
The phrase is also used in Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. Commission, Case 193183,
[1986] E.C.R. 611, 655, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489, 533, where the ECJ seems to regard
quality controls on licensed products covered by a patent as within the "specific subject
matter" of that patent, but only if such quality controls are carried out on the basis of
objectively verifiable criteria.
37. Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the
Internal European Market, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT LAW (I.I.C.] 131,
148 (1990).
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also applies if the national laws are introduced in order to imple-
ment Community directives. If, however, intellectual property
rights are introduced by regulation at a Community level, or even,
perhaps, by a directly applicable directive, Article 222 presumably
will not apply. A proprietor of such a Community patent, design,
or trademark would, therefore, not be able to rely on Article 222
in resisting a particular application of the free movement of goods
or competition provision of the Treaty to his intellectual property.
2. Free Movement of Goods Provisions-The Meaning of
Article 36
In Article 36 cases (concerning the free movement of goods),
the ECJ not only uses the notion of the "substance" of the right,
but sometimes also invokes the "basic function' 31 or "essential
function" 39 of intellectual property rights. These terms tend to refer
to the objective of the legislature in granting the right.' The es-
sential function of a patent, for instance, is to ensure for the inven-
tor an opportunity to obtain a reward for his efforts or innovation
and thus, if seen ex ante, gives an incentive for would-be inventors
to invest time, money, and efforts into research.4 If a particular
exercise of an intellectual property right does not reasonably corre-
spond to the essential function of the right, the principle of free
movement of goods prevails.
More recently, the ECJ has taken to using the words "legitimate
38. Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapfere & Co., Case
119/75, 4N 5-6, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, 1061, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 505-06.
39. S.A. Compagnie Gdndral pour la Diffusion de la T6l6vision v. Cinf Vog
Films, Case 62/79, 114, [1980] E.C.R. 881, 903, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 362, 400; Coditel
S.A. v. Cind-Vog Films S.A., Case 262/81, 1 12, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, 3401, [1983] 1
C.M.L.R. 49, 65; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer mbH, Case 102/77, 7, [1978] E.C.R. 1139, 1164, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 217, 227; see also Hag H, supra note 31, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 571.
40. In Hoffmann-La Roche and Hag H1 (both concerning trademarks), the "specific
subject matter" was distinguished from the "essential function." Hoffmann-La Roche,
[1978] E.C.R. at 1139, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 217; Hag 11, supra note 31, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. at 571.
41. This ex ante approach, looking at the incentive rather than at a reward,
appears only in recent case law. See Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma SpA, 1 19, Case
35/87, [1988] E.C.R. 3585, 3607, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 549, 561. Reward and incentive
are, however, two sides of the same coin: prospects of a reward act as an incentive,
and the actual reward is nothing but the incentive realized.
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exercise" and "abusive" or "improper exercise" in copyright and
design cases involving Article 36.42 "Legitimate" exercise is "justi-
fied" under Article 36 to protect intellectual property, and "abusive
exercise" is defined as "of such a nature as to maintain or establish
artificial partitions within the Common Market.,
43
Why has the ECJ begun to use different words than the tradi-
tional "exercise" and "existence" and why does it ponder the "func-
tion" of the rights? It has been said that the existence of an intel-
lectual property right can be equated to the aggregate of all the
different ways of exercising it.44 This mere semantic debate may
be at the root of the ECJ's wording. However, the matter also may
be more fundamental. In recent Article 36 cases, the ECJ appar-
ently felt the need to explain why the national law was reasonable
and why it should be available as a defense against a claim based
on Article 30.4 5 Such an analysis is suggested by the text of Arti-
cle 36, which requires that the restriction of imports be "justified"
by the protection of the intellectual property right and that the
"prohibitions or restrictions shall not . . . constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States."
The word "justified" has a connotation of proportionality and
reasonableness. For this reason it might be taken to indicate that
the ECJ is entitled to review the "substance" of intellectual proper-
ty under national law, in order to verify whether the core bundle of
rights granted by national law indeed outweighs the interest the
Community has in the free movement of goods. It is important to
42. Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, Case 144/81, 1 24, [1982] E.C.R.
2853, 2873, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47, 83; E.M.I. Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und
Export, Case 341/87, 1 8, [1989] E.C.R. 79, 95, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413, 423. The
Tribunal also used these terms in the Magill cases in an Article 86 context.
43. See also Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Prods. Corp., Case 3/78, [1978]
E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326.
44. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 147 (4th ed. 1990). For additional criticism of the distinction between
existence and exercise, see Beier, supra note 37, at 147.
45. See Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, 1115-16, [1988] E.C.R. 2605,
2629, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 684, 698-99; Thetford, 1 15, [1988] E.C.R. at 3596-97,
[1988] 3 C.M.L.R. at 561; Patricia, [1989] E.C.R. at 96, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 423.
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note, however that the ECJ has so far consistently rejected argu-
ments that it should review the legitimacy of, for instance, trade-
mark protection in Germany, or patent or design rights in the Unit-
ed Kingdom or Italy.4 Moreover, as has been emphasized before,
Article 36 applies to free movement of goods and services cases
only and Article 222 is not identical to Article 36. Article 222
does not refer to restriction having to be "justified" and does not
contain the reference to "arbitrary discrimination" or "disguised
restriction on trade." These considerations may be relevant when
applying the competition provisions of the Treaty to patents and
other forms of intellectual property.
V. ARTICLES 85 AND 86: COMPETITION RULES
A. Article 85
While Article 85 applies to both horizontal and vertical arrange-
ments on the exploitation of intellectual property,47 most case law
in relation to intellectual property rights concerns license agree-
ments. The first cases date back to the 1960s41 and 1970s.49 From
the 1970s onward, the Commission adopted block exemptions
which state precisely the conditions under which certain kinds of
agreements are automatically exempted. The most relevant regula-
tions in the field of intellectual property concern patent licensing
agreements50 and know-how licensing agreements. 5 Agreements
46. See Thetford, [1988] E.C.R. 3585, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 549; Warner Bros.,
[1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684; Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova
Industrie C.A. Kapfere & Co., Case 119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R.
482.
47. See, e.g., Ministre Public v. Tournier, Case 395, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248 (on
copyright management societies).
48. See Itablissements Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v.
Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
49. See L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015,
[1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278.
50. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, O.J.
L 219/15 (1984).
51. Commission Regulation No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agree-
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that do not comply with the conditions for application of the block
exemption regulations continue to be dealt with by the Commission
on an individual basis.52 The Commission's traditional approach
to license agreements has been criticized on the grounds that cer-
tain restrictions on the licensee's and the licensor's conduct may
discourage competition. In particular, if the parties are unable to
impose certain ancillary restrictions, they may decide not to enter
into a licensing agreement, in which case there will be not more
but less competition. Recent case law of the Commission 3 and the
ECJ54 has allowed for such considerations to be taken into account.
B. Article 86
Article 86, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position,
has also been applied in the field of intellectual property.
1. Dominance
The ECJ has defined a dominant position as:
[A] position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertak-
ing which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to
behav'e to an appreciable extent independently of its com-
petitors, customers and ultimately of consumers.55 .
The possession of an exclusive right may be one of the factors
determining dominance, but it is not in itself conclusive. 56 A pat-
ments, O.J. L 61/1 (1989).
52. E.g.,, Windsurfing Int'l Inc.. v. Commission, Case 193/83, [1986] E.C.R. 611,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 489; Bayer AG v. Sullhofer, Case 65/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5249,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 182; Kai Ottung v. Klec & Weilbach A/S, Case 320/87, [1989]
E.C.R. 1177, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 915.
53. See Yves Rocher, 87/14/EEC, O.J. L 8/49 (1987); Computerland, 87/407, O.J.
L 222/12 (1987); Charles Jourdan, 89/94/EEC, O.J. L 35/31 (1989).
54. See Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Case
161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414 (concerning a franchising agree-
ment); Erauw-Jacqudry Sprl v. La Hesbignonne Soci6t6 Cooperative, Case 27/87,
[1988] E.C.R. 1919, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576 (concerning breeders' rights).
55. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, 65, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 277,
[1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 486-87.
56. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-GroBmarkte GmbH &
Co. KG, Case 78/70, 1 17, [1971] E.C.R. 487, 501, [1971] C.M.LR. 631, 639. See
Guy Leigh, EEC Competition Law and Intellectual Property, Speech before the Ameri-
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ent does not in and of itself allow a patentee to ignore competitors
and customers if another product can be substituted for the product
covered by the patent, and the function and characteristics of the
other product are sufficiently similar from the point of view of the
user. Nevertheless, if intellectual property rights cover spare parts
that cannot be substituted by a third party's spare parts, the Com-
mission has on occasion shown itself quickly inclined to find domi-
nance.
5 7
The nature of the right may also be relevant. For example, it
is arguable that a copyright which is necessarily co-existent with
a product of economic value could be a key indicator of dominance
in a relevant product market, and that the same is less likely to be
true in the case of a patent, which may only be an element of a
product. Equally, a trademark might not necessarily have any di-
rect relationship to a particular product market.5 8
In general, if a firm has a market share of more than forty per-
cent of the relevant product market in the relevant geographical
market, there is a risk that it might be found to be dominant (unless
in an oligopolistic market situation).
2. Abuse
The very essence of a patent is that it is exclusionary. A mere
refusal to allow others to exploit an invention should therefore not
be considered to be abusive, since that would mean stripping rights
under national law of all effect and leaving but a mere shell with
no meaningful existence. As explained above, under Article 222,
the provisions of the Treaty (in particular Articles 85 and 86) may
can Bar Association, PTC and Antitrust sections (transcript available from author).
57. See Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345; Opinion of Advocate-General Mischo, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng
UK Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122; Opinion of Advo-
cate-General Mischo, Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricambio per
Autoveicoli v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265.
58. One commentator suggests that Magill does not represent a change in the
Commission's attitude towards finding dominance in cases involving intellectual
property. See James Flynn, Intellectual Property and Anti-trust: EC Attitudes, 2 EuR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R] 49 (1992).
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not prejudice the rules in Member States governing the existence
of intellectual property.
For this reason, the ECJ has held that the mere fact that an
exclusive right is enforced does not constitute an abuse,59 nor does
the simple refusal to grant a license to a third party. In the words
of the ECJ:
[T]he right of the proprietor of a protected design to pre-
vent third parties from manufacturing and selling or import-
ing, without its consent, products incorporating the design
constitutes the very subject matter of his exclusive right. It
follows that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a
protected design to grant to third parties, even in return for
a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products
incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor there-
of being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right,
and that a refusal to grant such a licence cannot in itself
constitute an abuse of a dominant position.6
Prohibiting the mere exercise of the right would reduce it, in
some cases, out of existence. As explained below, this is exactly
what happened in Magill, which is now on appeal to the ECJ.61 In
Magill, the Commission and the CH1 prohibited copyright holders
from doing the very thing that the applicable national copyright law
allowed them to do: prevent unauthorized third parties from pro-
ducing and distributing copyrighted material. If such result should
be affirmed broadly, the effectiveness of patent based exclusionary
rights could be influenced thereby.
As has been seen, traditionally the ECJ has drawn a line be-
tween the "existence" and the "exercise" of a right, indicating that
an abusive exercise requires certain additional features over and
above the mere refusal to allow others to use the protected rights. 62
59. Renault, '115, [1988] E.C.R. at 6072, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 282.
60. Volvo, 8, [1988] E.C.R. at 6235, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135.
61. See supra note 5.
62. Renault, 1 16, [1988] E.C.R. at 6073, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 282; Volvo, 9,
[1988] E.C.R. at 6235, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135-36; Basset v. SACEM, Case 402/85,
I 18-19, [1987] E.C.R. 1747, 1769; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm
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Use is not in itself abuse.63 To illustrate this approach, in Volvo
and Renault, the ECJ mentioned three carefully selected examples
of such additional features.
The three examples of abusive conduct cited in Volvo and
Renault were the following: (i) the arbitrary refusal to supply body
panels (i.e., the protected goods) to independent repairers (i.e.,
purchasers who used these goods for the services they offered); (ii)
the fixing of prices for the body panels at an unfair level; and (iii)
ceasing production of the body panels even though they would still
be needed on a large scale for repairs and maintenance." In effect,
the ECJ indicated that it would 'not permit intellectual property
rights to be used to gain an unfair advantage in a market for prod-
ucts not covered by the rights. in other words, the ECJ would not
permit the rights of the patentee or other rightsholders to be exer-
cised illegitimately outside their proper scope. On the other hand,
the ECJ declined to uphold a challenge to either the existence of
the right or rights fundamental to that existence.
Thus, taking the first two examples, if spare parts are arbitrarily
refused or unfairly highly priced, third parties are precluded from
repairing certain automobiles since they cannot purchase the parts
and are precluded from making the spare parts without a license.
As a result, they cannot compete with the repair service provided
by the rightsholder. The market in which the latter thus obtains an
advantage, the service market, does not require exploitation of the
intellectual property or performance of any act which is reserved
for the rightsholder. Independent repairers only need the spare
part, not the right to make it.
As to the third example, if spare parts for recent models cease
to be available and no third party is authorized to produce them,
users of cars with defective parts (i.e., customers who have been
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 102/77, 1 16, [1978]
E.C.R. 1139, 1167, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217, 243-44.
63. Brenda Sufrin, Comment on the Magill Case, 2 EUR. L. REP. 67 (1992). Ms.
Sufrin suggests that Magill is as much application of Article 86 to a refusal to supply
as it is an attack on intellectual property rights.
64. Renault, 1 16, (1988] E.C.R. at 6073, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 282; Volvo, 1 9,
[1988] E.C.R. at 6235, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135-36.
[Vol. 4:55
EEC LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
supplied in the past and who have therefore become dependent on
the supply of parts) are forced to purchase new models. The mar-
ket in which the effect of the behavior is felt and the unfair advan-
tage is obtained is the market for automobiles. A remedy in all
three examples would be to leave the choice to the producer wheth-
er to supply the parts within a reasonable time and at reasonable
prices or to grant a license.
Although the list of examples is not exhaustive, it does not
suggest that other examples should include situations where com-
peting firms need to engage in restricted acts (copying, in the case
of copyright and design, or exploiting an invention, in the case of
patents) to enter the dependent market. There is no indication that
the ECJ in Volvo and Renault abandoned the principle set out in
Article 222 that there is a core bundle of rights which are reserved
to the rightsholder and which are not called into question by the
competition rules of the Treaty.
Thus, the law remained, after Volvo and Renault, that even if
the reasoning expressed in those cases applies equally to patents,
as may well be the case, there is no principle of Community law
which requires the granting of a license, except in the particular
type of circumstances discussed above. Specifically, one might
still expect the specific subject matter of a patent to comprise at
least (i) the exclusive right of the patentee to place patented goods
on the market either himself or through a third party with his con-
sent, i.e., a licensee; and (ii) the right to pursue infringers.
However, there are now the decisions of the Commission and
the CFI in Magill,65 to which reference has been made above, and
65. See supra note 5. The factual background -for Magill is stated in the
Response 'to Notice of Appeal of the Commission in Radio Telefis Iireann v.
Commission, Case C-241/91P, 11 2-5, as follows:
2. The Commission reminds this Court that the Decision of December 21,
1988 arose out of a complaint to the Commission by an Irish enterprise
called Magill TV Guide Ltd. (Magill). Magill desired to bring out a weekly
publication containing details of forthcoming radio and television
programmes, showing not just one broadcaster's programmes but several
broadcasters' programmes (BBC, RTE and ITP) in parallel. Such guides are
common in other Member States but did not emerge in the U.K. or in Ireland
because of the refusal of the broadcast companies there, based on copyright
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which is currently on appeal to the ECJ. The potential significance
of Magill is difficult to assess, even if the existing Commission
Decision and Judgment of the CFI are upheld, because of its very
particular facts. However, because of its possible serious implica-
tions, it is worthy of special mention.
law unique to those countries, to permit the publication of any magazine
which would damage the monopoly position of the broadcasters' own "cap-
tive" weekly magazine. Thus Irish consumers who wished to plan a week's
viewing had to buy RTE Guide, Radio Times (BBC), and TV Times (ITP),
whereas Magill wanted to offer a single guide containing all this information.
3. The broadcasters prepared weekly "listings" of their own programmes
for the forthcoming week, and distributed those widely to national, regional
and local newspapers, encouraging them to reprint programme times on a
daily basis (two days at weekends) but forbidding them to reprint the materi-
al on a weekly basis. The publication of weekly schedules of the U.K.
broadcasters' programmes in other Member States (such as Belgium, France
and The Netherlands) was tolerated or not opposed. However, they acted
swiftly to close down the Magill TV Guide immediately after its publication
of multi-channel programme information on a weekly basis. The U.K.-based
companies were concerned that copies of the Magill TV Guide could be sold
in the U.K. and could encroach on the parallel monopoly otherwise enjoyed
there by Radio Times and TV Times respectively.
4. When the Decision was taken in December 1988, Magill had already
been closed down by the grant of interlocutory relief to the three companies.
On July 26, 1989, Lardner J. held that under Irish copyright law copyright
could indeed subsist in the lists of programmes, rejecting the arguments of
Magill that the plaintiffs were seeking an impermissible copyright over mere
information. He declined to make a distinction between arranging a series of
programmes with the purpose of attracting viewers, and the publication of
information about that series of programmes. It was clear that a slavish re-
production of copyright material could constitute an infringement; but wheth-
er Magill's new method of presenting and compiling a combination of data,
including basic facts such as time, channel and title descriptions in a novel
multi-channel format would constitute a new, non-infringing, compilation
appears not to have been considered.
5. The Commission's findings were that the three enterprises were each
dominant on two markets, the market for the supply of television listings and
the market for weekly television programme guides. The Commission found
that the Applicants' respective dominant positions had been abused by the
assertion of copyright rights in one market to retain the effective monopoly
they enjoyed on the second market, and which they exercised to prevent the
emergence of a new product.
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C. Magill-Its Reasonable Implications
The essence of the three Magill cases is that the Commission
and the CR1 prohibited three broadcasting organizations, British
Broadcasting Corp. ("BBC"), Independent Television Productions
("ITP") and Radio Telefis tireann ("RTE"), from invoking a right
they had under national copyright law to exclude competitors from
copying and disseminating certain program lists. Although the
Magill cases concern copyrights, they may present fundamental
questions on the relationship between intellectual property and EC
competition law. Thus, these cases are relevant to the question of
whether national patents will continue to be viable to maintain
exclusionary rights in inventions in the EC in the future. Notably,
the "market" which was the object for exploitation in Magill (as-
suming it was a separate market) was a market for products that
required reproduction of the protected work. In this major respect,
Magill deviates from Volvo and Renault.
In order to reach its conclusion, the CFI seemed not to refer to
the traditional existence/exercise dichotomy. Instead, it used a
somewhat confusing array of different arguments.
First, it distinguished "legitimate exercise" from "improper
exercise'-notions which it seems to have taken from cases decid-
ed under Article 36.66 "Improper exercise" is defined as "likely to
create artificial partitions within the market or pervert the rules
governing competition." This appears to differ from the definition
of "improper exercise" used in the past in the case law of the ECJ,
which referred only to "artificial partitions within the Common
Market." Moreover, the CR1 did not indicate clearly why the
broadcasting companies' behavior was an abuse, i.e., what addition-
al circumstances or behavior over and above the exercise of the
copyright itself led to a finding of abuse. The notions of "legiti-
66. Radio Telefis Iireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, 67, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case T-70/89, 52,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.
Commission, Case T-76/89, 52, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance). The CH
took these words from Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, Case 144/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 2853, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47, and other cases concerning Article 36 of the EEC
Treaty.
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mate" and "abusive" exercise appear to be derived from cases con-
cerning Article 36.. It is perhaps questionable whether they are
relevant in an Article 86 context, as explained above, since Article
36 is a special rule that applies only to the free movement of goods
provisions.
In addition, there is no reference in Magill to any set of core
rights inherent in the existence of the copyright which are-as
Article 222 dictates-free from the interference of the EEC Treaty
so long as they are based on national law.
The CFI acknowledged the "actual substance of the intellectual
property" by quoting earlier cases from the ECJ.67 It stated that the
exclusive rights of the author "are not called in question by the
rules of the Treaty. '68 However, the CFI appears then to have done
something at least quite similar to that when it said that:69
While it is plain that the exercise of the exclusive right to
reproduce a protected work is not in itself an abuse, that
does not apply when, in the light of the details of each indi-
vidual case, it is apparent that that right is exercised in such
ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim mani-
festly contrary to the objectives of Article 86. In that
event, the copyright is no longer exercised in a manner
which corresponds to its essential function, within the
meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, which is to protect the
moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for the cre-
ative effort, while respecting the aims of, in particular, Arti-
cle 86.70
67. Radio Telefis tireann, 169; British Broadcasting Corp., '156; Independent Tele-
vision Publications, 1 54.
68. Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, 13, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, 2629,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684, 698.
69. See the Response to Notice of Appeal of the Commission in Radio Telefis
Iireann v. Commission, Case C-241/91P, II 37-38, where the Commission's view is
expressed: "National law [should] receive all proper respect from the Commission and
this Court, but it cannot be sovereign."
70. Radio Telefis gireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, 1 71, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case T-70/89, 58,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.
Commission, Case T-76189, 1 56, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance).
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Thus, the CH applied the "essential function" test (which is
based on the word "justified" in Article 36, not on Article 222)
though perhaps changing its meaning somewhat. In addition, it
changes the meaning of "essential function." According to the case
law of the ECJ, the "essential function" is a concept of Community
law, the contents of which are determined by national law. The
CH seems to have imported EC competition rules (Article 86) into
the contents of "essential function" and thus into the "existence" of
copyright.
In other words, whereas under the case law of the ECJ in com-
petition cases there was a core bundle of rights (determined by
national law in the absence of Community harmonization), which
the provisions of the EEC Treaty did not affect, the CF now seems
to be using Article 86 of the Treaty to determine what the core
rights are, and thus circumvent Article 222. In doing so, it has
allowed Community law to override national laws in an area which
Article 222 reserved to national legislation and harmonization."
The CR justified its reasoning that Article 86 may override nation-
al law by saying that
the primacy of Community law, particularly as regards prin-
ciples as fundamental as those of the free movement of
goods and freedom of competition, prevails over any use of
a rule of national intellectual property law in a manner con-
trary to those principles.72
This statement seems to be contrary to Article 222, as interpret-
ed until now by the ECJ. The CR confirms its approach by stating
that "the exercise of an exclusive right which, in principle, corre-
71. See the Response to Notice of Appeal of the Commission in Radio Telefls
lireann v. Commission, Case C-241/91P, 1 40, where the Commission is even more
explicit:
Whether the Court of First Instance would be right or wrong in its assessment
of the meaning of concepts like the essential function and specific subject
matter of copyright within Article 36 is not dispositive on the question of
whether the conduct of the Applicants can fall foul of Article 86.
This suggests that Article 36 does, and Article 222 does not, apply in Article 86 cases.
72. Radio Telefis lireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89, 71, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
586 (Ct. First Instance); British Broadcasting Corp., 58; Independent Television Prods.,
1 56.
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sponds to the substance of the relevant intellectual property may
nevertheless be prohibited by Article 86 if it involves, on the part
of the undertaking holding a dominant position, certain abusive
conduct.""
D. The Potential Effects of the Magill Cases
If the judgments in the Magill cases are upheld broadly by the
ECJ and if, in addition, similar reasoning is subsequently applied
in a patents context (which it is to be hoped would not be the
case), then the consequences could be detrimental for the encour-
agement of innovation. This might, in turn, undermine true compe-
tition both within the Community and between the Community and
its major trading partners.
The main substantive effect of the Magill reasoning is that at
its broadest it could be understood as potentially having the effect
of forcing an intellectual property proprietor to license its core
rights to would be competitors for products that compete with the
proprietor's own product but have some different characteristics.
In spite of the CFI's identifying a different product market, there
was evidence that the comprehensive weekly guide would compete
head-on with the broadcasters' weekly guides. The Commission in
its decision took the view that the raw information itself (the ad-
vance listing) could be a separate market.74
73. Radio Telefis itireann, 1 72; British Broadcasting Corp., 59; Independent
Television Prods., 57.
74. Magill TV Guide/Independent Television Prods., British Broadcasting Corp. &
Radio Telefis lAireann, 89/205, O.J. L 78, at 43-51, 20 (1989). It should be emphasized
that the Court of First Instance identified two product markets in Magill the first being
the market for TV listings themselves and the second being the market for TV listing
magazines. This peculiar market definition allowed the CH to find abuse in the form of
exploiting dominance in one market by controlling a derivative market. Of course,
although the finding of abuse in circumstances where dominance in one market is used
to gain an advantage in another market is unsurprising, e.g., tying arrangements, what is
unusual is the market definition in this case which allows such an analysis to proceed.
The first market is arguably a market in the intellectual property rights themselves. Such
market definition would proceed to a finding of abuse in almost any case where there was
refusal to license intellectual property rights.
The very peculiar nature of the copyright material in Magill cannot be over empha-
sized. Copyright in compilations where there is no artistic or original creativity involved
is only recognized in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. All
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With markets so narrowly defined, one could possibly identify
competing but different products also in other areas, such as
pharmaceuticals and data processing, or treat raw "technology"
(i.e., the patent right) as a separate market. This could substantial-
ly affect intellectual property protection. If a competitor can obtain
access to a patentee's technology to apply it in a different but com-
peting product, the incentive to invest in research and development
may be expected to decrease. Inventors will likely have less dis-
cretion to decide how to exploit their rights and competing busi-
nesses may in many cases attempt to obtain a license rather than
developing competing technology themselves, resulting in a reduc-
tion of technological variety. If the ECJ affirms Magill, it is
hoped, inter alia, that it will limit the application of the principles
underlying Magill to cases involving markets for products that do
not compete and where firms have been made dependent by the
overt acts of the rightsholder"
Another effect could be produced by the difference between
Magill and the traditional refusal to supply cases. In previous
cases, a refusal to supply has only been found to be abusive if the
customer was previously supplied and there was no objective justi-
other EC countries have a more stringent test for originality which would exclude such
material from copyright protection. The protection given listings in the Netherlands is
largely a function of how broadcasting time is allocated on the public service channels
in that country. The time allocated is based on the number of subscribers.to a particular
broadcaster's listings magazine. It is also noteworthy that in the Netherlands each maga-
zine carries listings from all the broadcasters as they license one another but not other
publications. The protection of listings in Denmark is pursuant to a specific statutory
right separate, from copyright which is of a shorter duration than copyright (10 years).
This protection is not extended to non-nationals.
The continental European justification for copyright protection is based on the au-
thor's right to control the publication and reproduction of the fruits of his own creative
effort. Although recognition of certain copyright works such as films serves to protect
purely economic interests literary copyright serves to protect only the author's creative
effort under continental European jurisprudence.
However, at least one commentator has concluded that even under the proposed EC
Database Directive compulsory licensing would not be mandated in the Magill situation.
Michael Pattison, The European Commission's Proposal on the Protection of Computer
Databases, 4 E.I.P.R. 113 (1992).
75. In this connection it should be noted that the market definition is not before the
Court.
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fication for choking off supplies.76 This could be explained by the
circumstance that the customer had made investments and had
become dependent on the supply of the products in question. By
contrast, in Magill a new business opportunity (which would com-
pete, to a greater or lesser extent, with the broadcasters' magazines)
was to be pursued by exceeding the terms of any license available
from the program makers. In order to avoid such a shift in the
law, the ECJ may, indeed, take care to limit the effect of Magill to
cases where there is both an existing market and actual demand, or
where arbitrary conditions of supply are being applied.
Further, in Magill it was said that the broadcasting companies
prevented the emergence of a so-called "new product" for which
there was alleged potential consumer demand (according to the
Commission) which was not met. Comprehensive weekly guides
existed in all Member States except the United Kingdom and Ire-
land. They were "new" in the sense that they combined the BBC,
ITP and RTE listings in a single magazine. Purchasers could get
all the details by buying the three independent magazines and de-
mand was substantially being met by the rightsholders. It is a
serious question whether it is justified to abrogate exclusivity rights
where demand is being met by the rightsholders or by one or more
(cross) licensees and there is simply an opening for a slightly dif-
ferent but perhaps more convenient product.7' Nevertheless, that
appears to be the present result of Magill.
76. See Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Com-
mission, Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, II 23-25, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 250, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R.
309, 340; Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345; Centre Beige d'Etudes de March6-Tdltmarketing CBEM SA v.
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Tdl&liffusion SA, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 558.
77. At least one commentator sharply criticizes the CFI's market analysis. Jonathan
Smith, Television Guides: The European Court Doesn't Know "There's So Much in It,"
3 EUR. COMMuNTY L. REV. [E.C.L.R.] 135 (1992). Mr. Smith comments that TV view-
ers do not change stations because there is a lack of listings, pointing out that 80% of
viewers looked to newspaper listings that were published with the broadcasters' permis-
sion. Other commentators say that although the broadcasters had sufficient output, con-
sumer demand was not satisfied. Diane Price, Abuse of a Dominant Position-the Tale
of Nails, Milk Cartons, and TV Guides, 2 E.C.L.R. 80 (1990).
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Under a more traditional analysis, a patentee should be able in
his discretion to keep certain technology and information for itself
and to exploit it by incorporating it in his own products. To force
a patentee to institute a licensing program for technology where he
has not made the technology available to third parties, would be a
great danger for the commercially feasible exploitation of intellec-
tual property.
E. Some Options for the ECJ in Magill
1. Option 1
The ECJ could overturn the decision's grant of a compulsory
license and confirm in clear and unambiguous terms that an abuse
under Article 86 requires more than just the exercise of an intellec-
tual property right.
2. Option 2
The ECJ need not follow the CFI's approach to the definition
of dominance and, indeed, might wish to take the opportunity af-
forded by Magill to reassert that dominance must be determined by
reference to economic power and ability to act independently in the
market place.78
3. Option 3
The ECJ need not follow the CH's approach to confirm that the
broadcasting companies abused a dominant position. Arguably, the
broadcasting companies' conduct (in particular, the conditions they
applied to licenses), for example, may be deemed to have been
discriminatory and arbitrary. In this regard the broadcasting com-
panies appear to have been willing to license their program listingsto any interested parties. It appears to have been only when they
perceived that Magill was intent on exceeding the parameters of
78. The broadcasters' economic power might be considered collectively, even though
their parallel behavior was not concerted. Martin Schbdermeier, Collection Dominance
Revisited: An Analysis of the EC Commission's New Concepts of Oligopoly Control, I
E.C.L.R. 28 (1990).
79. One commentator suggests that it may indeed be appropriate to limit intellectual
property rights when their exercise affects consumers but that the EC's authority to
impose such limitations should be narrowly defined. Andreas Reindl, The Magic of
Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 I.I.C. 60 (1993).
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that license in a manner that threatened their own publications that
they chose to assert their copyright. Possibly this conduct could be
deemed arbitrary and discriminatory and, to that extent, not dissim-
ilar to the conduct regarded as prohibited in both Volvo and
Renault. The court might in either case point out that the facts and
circumstances in Magill were very unusual. 80
4. Option 4
The ECJ could attempt to limit Magill to its facts. The cases
present some special features that distinguish them from other situ-
ations where a refusal to license could arise.
These special features include the facts that: One, BBC, 1TP
and RTE had by statute exclusive responsibility for the dissemina-
tion of television programs, and thus were the only entities which
could create listings. No amount of investment would allow third
parties to create a competing listing. The broadcasters might there-
fore be regarded as having a special obligation to make the infor-
mation available. Two, the program listings were a by-product of
the creation of the programs themselves. The control of program
listings and their publication is thus arguably more a question of
broadcasting regulation than of intellectual property.
In the end, however, these considerations are as much in the
nature of policy arguments as of purely legal arguments. They are,
therefore, particularly appropriate considerations to be taken into
account by the legislature when reforming broadcasting-and the
United Kingdom government has indeed done so in a statute.
The fact that the program listings did not involve much intellec-
tual or artistic effort also is a suspect justification for abridging the
principle set out in Article 222. As long as there is no harmonized
Community law on copyright and national law governs these rights,
the Community should accept-and, in the past, has accept-
ed l-the discrepancies resulting therefrom. This includes the fact
80. Thomas C. Vinje, Magill: Its Impact on the Information Technology Industry,
11 E.I.P.R. 397 (1992); Addendum: Magill, 2 E.I.P.R. 71 (1993). While favoring broad
application of Magill to intellectual property rights, Mr. Vinje suggests the Magill deci-
sion results from "unusual facts and unusual protection [by intellectual property law]."
81. Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, Case 144/81, 1 18, [1982] E.C.R. 2853,
[1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47; E.M.I. Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, Case 341/87,
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that certain Member States protect "banal" or (in Commission ter-
minology) "functional or utilitarian" works.
The ECJ could limit the case to intellectual property rights such
as copyright that, unlike patents, are not subject broadly to statuto-
ry compulsory licenses, on the basis of the argument that if the na-
tional legislature provides expressly for a compulsory license to
prevent unfair exploitation, this must be exhaustive, whereas in the
absence of a compulsory license provision, abusive exercise must
be limited otherwise.82
5. Option 5
The ECJ could uphold the CFI decision without limiting the
case to its facts and suggesting distinguishing factors. This would
raise serious questions in terms of the obligations (in the case of
other types of intellectual property and in particular, patents) to
grant licenses on reasonable commercial terms. In this connection
it is noteworthy that the Magill cases arguably had more to do with
the underlying information than copyright (as hinted at by the
Commission in its judgment). The ECJ may choose to build upon
that distinction, perhaps reflecting upon the Commission's recently
adopted proposals for a Directive to regulate electronic databases
with which there are many parallels with television program list-
ings. In this proposal the Commission suggests that there should
be a separate right to control and prevent the unfair extraction of
the contents of a database. However, this right is subject to com-
pulsory licensing on fair and non-discriminatory terms if the mate-
[1989] E.C.R. 79, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413.
82. Another important distinction is between copyright and know-how. As appears
from the Commission's block exemption for know-how licensing agreements, secrecy is
the essential subject matter of know-how. Commission Regulation No. 556/89 of 30
November 1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories
of Know-how Licensing Agreements, arts. 1(7)(1-2), 2(1)(1), O.J. L 61/1, at 1-8 (1989).
The information in the listings was not secret and a supply obligation to a limited number
of licensees therefore did not prejudice the right to enforce the copyright as against third
parties who did not qualify for a compulsory license. In the case of know-how, however,
there is a risk that once the information is disseminated widely enough, it will not be
possible to enforce confidentiality obligations under the rules of trade secret, confidence,
contract, unfair competition, tort, and other laws relevant to protect know-how. This
could lead to a loss of the income from exploitation and license agreements.
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rial cannot be independently created or obtained from another
source. The possible parallel with Magill is clear.
Moreover, the Community now has a "legislative baseline" for
the inter-relationship between competition and copyright law, in the
Software Directive. 3 Interestingly, while the Software Directive
allows decompilation (an otherwise prohibited act), it does not
allow this for the purpose of developing a competing product.
Moreover, such a right is enjoyed only by a legitimate licensee
does not take away a copyright holder's right to determine whether
or not to license its product.
6. Option 6
Even more of a departure: the ECJ might'attempt to adopt the
approach of finding that no copyright Should have existed in the
TV listings. This would involve a reinterpretation of Article 222
enabling the ECJ to review the existence of national intellectual
property rights and many might argue the implications to be more
damaging than a straightforward endorsement of Magill.
F. Other Issues
The Magill case raises many issues which have not been dis-
cussed here and which are in any case worthy of papers in them-
selves. Not the least of these is whether all intellectual property
rights are based on the same philosophy. It could, for example, be
argued that copyright has as much to do with ownership and attri-
bution of authorship as with exclusive rights in contrast to intellec-
tual property rights such as patents which are said primarily to do
with "monopoly." Such an argument would have attractions to
many European jurists.
Also worthy of discussion is whether copyright differs from
other intellectual property rights in that there is usually a coexis-
tence between a copyright and a product of economic value which
is not necessarily the case with rights such as patents. In the
Magill case, the CH certainly seemed to be preoccupied by the co-
existence of copyright and the concept of a "factual monopoly" in
83. Software Directive, supra note 7.
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the underlying information.84 Seen in those terms, the concept of
"factual monopoly" may seem innocuous enough but it is, perhaps,
a dangerous principle for the development of the Community com-
petition law whether restricted to the intellectual property field or
not.
Magill also raises fundamental questions as to the viability of
market definitions and concepts of dominance in Community com-
petition law and, therefore, could turn out to be a watershed deci-
sion for Community law. Equally, of course, it might be thought
to be something of an aberration based on highly unusual circum-
stances.
In the light of the foregoing, it is thought likely that the ECJ
will find a way of limiting the effect of Magill to its facts since to
do otherwise will have broad and far reaching effects which are not
likely to be warranted or desirable and are not demanded by the
Magill factual situation. At the very least, the ECJ may feel con-
strained to restrict Magill to copyright. Its effects in that domain
may, of course, be serious not least because it would be substan-
tially inconsistent with the Software Directive, the proposed Data-
base Directive, and certain other proposals for copyright harmoni-
zation, all of which are supposed to be declaratory of the existing
law.
CONCLUSION
The law in the EC is, indeed, changing in manifold respects.
Moreover, as the Commission contemplates its consolidation of the
patent and know-how licensing block exemptions and begins to
consider the many other initiatives that are on the agenda, one can
only believe that it is a time to stay alert as the foundations for
licensing are in flux.
84. One commentator suggests that an analysis analogous to the U.S. antitrust essen-
tial facilities doctrine would be helpful to Magill. This would focus analysis on the
"factual monopoly." Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with whom one Pleases under
EEC Competition Law: A Small Contribution to a Necessary Debate, 6 E.C.L.R. 234
(1992).
1993]

